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The Expungement or Restriction of Arrest Records
An individual can be subject to arrest and have no connection
with any criminal activities. It should be noted, of course, that
under current procedures which have been in effect for a
number of years, it is relatively easy for such an individual
to have the record of such an arrest expunged. However, peo-
ple are often denied employment on the basis of a mere arrest
record, records that are provided by Criminal Justice Infor-
mation Systems. This is fundamentally unfair and must be
stopped.
It is important now more than ever that this Congress be con-
cerned with the security and privacy data in Criminal Justice
Information Systems. The problem we're dealing with goes
beyond the setting of curbs or an invasion of privacy. The
problem also involves the defining and limiting of the uses of
Criminal Justice Information.
- Testimony of Attorney General
William B. Saxbe before House
Judiciary Committee, Sub-Committee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights
(February 26, 1974)*
VER THE PAST DECADE, concern has arisen regarding the adverse
effects stemming from the misuse of arrest records. "Millions of
people in America - probably tens of millions - have a record of
conviction; even more have a record of arrest."1 The FBI reported
that in 1969 alone there were approximately seven and one-half mil-
lion arrests in the United States for all criminal acts, excluding traffic
offenses.' Crime can not be condoned, but once an arrested individual
has been exonerated, the arrest record should be expunged and not
allowed to remain a "record" to be used against him in the future.
The multiplying number of arrest records kept by the govern-
ment 3 and private agencies (such as the mass media), the tendency
of these organizations to share information, and the speed and ac-
curacy with which such information can be collected and dissem-
inated through electronic means, presents a great threat to individual
Appreciation is extended to Radio Station WGAR for allowing us access to the transcription
of Attorney General Saxbe's remarks.
1 A. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS 640 (1963).
2FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 31 (1969).
2For a discussion of the largest collector of these records- the F.B.I. Identification Division
-sea Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
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privacy.4 Access to one's life history is available instantaneously.
Private affairs are made public, and the adverse effects resulting
therefrom could ruin many innocent persons- including exonerated
arrestees. Collection of fingerprints, photographs, and other identifica-
tion data of persons arrested by local, state, and federal law enforce-
ment agencies, and dissemination of such information at the agency's
discretion,5 often before the case reaches final disposition, is a nation-
wide practice.
The court in Menard v. Mitchell recognized the collateral dis-
abilities attached to an arrest record when so disseminated when it
noted:
Information denominated a record of arrest, if it becomes
known, may subject an individual to serious difficulties. Even
if no direct economic loss is involved, the injury to an in-
dividual's reputation may be substantial. Economic losses
themselves may be both direct and serious. Opportunties for
schooling, employment, or professional licenses may be re-
stricted or nonexistent as a consequence of the mere fact of
an arrest, even if followed by acquittal or complete exonera-
tion of the charges involved. An arrest record may be used
by the police in determining whether subsequently to arrest
the individual concerned, or whether to exercise their discre-
tion to bring formal charges against an individual already
arrested. Arrest records have been used in deciding whether
to allow a defendant to present his story without impeach-
ment by prior convictions, and as a basis for denying release
prior to trial or an appeal; or they may be considered by a
judge in determining the sentence to be given a convicted
offender.6
An arrestee seeking employment encounters almost insurmount-
able obstacles when confronted with his arrest record by a prospective
employer. Often employers will not hire an individual with a "record"
because their low-cost "blanket bond" contains a provision voiding
protection if the employer hires individuals with an arrest record
without prior consent of the surety.7 A survey in New York City
showed that about seventy-five percent of the employment agencies
4 See Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157, 148-59 (Colo. 1972); A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRI-
VACY 34 (1971); Karst, The Files: Legal Controls Over The Accuracy And Accessibility Of
Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 365-66 (1966).
SE.g., FLA. STAT. §30.31(1) (1969).
6430 F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157, 159
(Colo. 1972).
7 Gough, The Expungement Of Adjudication Records Of Juvenile And Adult Offenders: A
Problem Of Status, 1966 WASH.U.L.Q. 147, 158 (1966) [hereinafter cited as GOUGH].
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ask applicants if they have an arrest record, and normally do not
refer those applicants that do- whether or not the arrest led to a
conviction. 8
Expungement or restrictions on the use of arrest records may
provide relief from these adverse effects.9 To expunge means "to de-
stroy or obliterate; it implies not a legal act, but a physical annihila-
tion."1 An expungement statute should, therefore, provide for the
destruction of those arrest records of individuals who have been ex-
onerated. Further, it should permit a negative reply upon inquiry,
thereby removing all disabilities and restoring all rights, leaving the
arrestee in the same position as if the event had never occurred. To
restrict the record means that the records are not open to public in-
spection, i.e., they must not be disseminated, except for the required
use in the criminal justice system.
Generally, one seeking such expungement or a restriction on
access to his record brings a civil action in equity against the police
department retaining the records." "The character of relief sought
involves a civil right and . . . there is no basis for assumption of
jurisdiction by the Criminal Court.' 2 Administrative remedies must
be exhausted before an action for expungement can be maintained,
however, and relief should be sought in the state courts before bring-
ing action in federal courts.13
The scope of the following analysis will not include conviction
records, records of civil cases, or military records of arrest and/or
conviction under the Uniform Code of Military Justice though many
topics to be discussed will also be relevant to such records. Further,
since the juvenile court is not a criminal court,' 4 and because of the
special status of juvenile records, they will not be considered herein,
except to note that juveniles also need to be protected from the burdens
8 THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, RE-
PORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
REPORTI.
9 For a discussion of expungement and sealing see Kogon & Loughery, Sealing and Expunge-
ment Of Criminal Records-The Big Lie, 61 J.CRIM.L.C. & P.S. 378, 379, 380 (1970).
10 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 693 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). Expungement was probably first in-
troduced by the National Conference on Parole, PAROLE IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 137,
138 (1956).
"See Irani v. District of Columbia, 292 A.2d 804, 806 (D.C. App. 1972) (An action to ex-
punge is not a criminal case, although the original charge was criminal in nature. The relief
of expungement is civil in nature).
12 People v. Lewerenz, 42 Ill.App.2d 410, 413, 192 N.E.2d 401, 402 (1963).
13Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.Supp. 718, 723-24 (D.D.C. 1971).
14 GOUGH, supra note 7, at 168. The author states: "It is truistic to say that the juvenile court
is not a criminal court . "
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of a record,"s and that statutes have provided this relief.16 This analysis
will be concerned with existing statutory law, case law, and proposals
relating to the expungement or restriction of adult, non-military,
arrest records, i.e., the records of an individual who was arrested but
subsequently exonerated because he was not charged, the charges were
dropped, the case was dismissed, or he was acquitted.
The "record" may be fingerprints, photographs, or any other
criminal identification data held by either the agencies of the criminal
justice system or others outside the system. If the arrestee was ex-
onerated, the information is called an "arrest record" which is sup-
posed to be confidential and closed to the public,17 but which indeed is
far from confidential and is in practice almost open to the public. 18
Furthermore, many of the arrest records are either inaccurate or in-
complete as to final disposition 9 - facts which tend to increase the
probability of adverse effects to the arrestee.20
In some jurisdictions, statutes provide for the restriction of gen-
eral police investigative data from the public, if it is being used for
law enforcement.2 1 But in the absence of such statutes, courts have
held this information to be confidential to protect both the investiga-
tion itself and the persons giving information to aid the investigation.2
One court has held that police department records are privileged and
not subject to subpoena duces tecum.23 Since these statutes are designed
to protect police investigations and not those under investigation they
will grant the arrestee little, if any, relief.
1s For a discussion of juvenile records see GOUGH, supra note 7, at 168-78.
16 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2151.358 (Page Supp. 1969) provides that "Any person who
has been adjudicated a delinquent or unruly child, may apply to the court for an expunge-
ment of his record, or the court may initiate expungement proceedings." There is a two year
waiting period and the court must find a satisfactory rehabilitation. If so found, the court
may order the records sealed, the case deemed never to have occurred, index references de-
leted, and that a negative reply to inquiries is proper.
"7See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §149.43 (Page 1969); Kolb v. O'Connor, 14 IU.App.2d 81,
142 N.E.2d 818 (1957).
'sSee Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F.Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971); A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRI-
VACY 34-35 (1971).
19 A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 34 (1971). The author notes that 35% of the FBI "rap
sheets" contain no followup information after the arrest data is submitted.
2o See Karst, The Files: Legal Controls Over The Accuracy And Accessibility Of Stored Per-
sonal Data, 31 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 353-59 (1966) for an examination of the
problems of inaccurate records.
21 See 5 U.S.C. §522(b) (7) (1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §1-19 (Supp. 1971).
2 See United States v. Mackey, 36 F.R.D. 431 (D.D.C.), afl'd 351 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23 Kott v. Perini, 283 F.Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
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The Exonerated Arrestee's Records
Only six jurisdictions have laws in force granting the exonerated
arrestee relief from the adverse effects of an arrest record.24 How-
ever, they are limited in effect and equivocal in the sense that they
usually do not apply to the local police agency, never apply to the
FBI's Identification Division, and rarely provide effective enforce-
ment provisions. Additionally, such statutes are generally riddled with
statutory and case law exceptions.
In the absence of statutory provisions most courts, until recently,
have refused to interfere, thus leaving to the police the decision of
whether or not to retain arrest records, reasoning that law enforce-
ment needs outweigh any harm to the individual.2 "However this is
not to say that, absent legislative action, judicial control may not be
imposed to protect a citizen from what might develop upon its facts
to be an unconstitutional invasion of his right of privacy. ' ' 26
Courts are now recognizing the need for restraints on police
discretion in retaining and disseminating arrest records. 2 7 The Dis-
trict Court for Puerto Rico has held that when
• . . an accused is acquitted of a crime or when he is dis-
charged without a conviction, no public good is accomplished
by the retention of criminal identification records. On the
other hand, a great imposition is placed upon the citizen. His
privacy and personal dignity is invaded . . .
2 4 Connecticut: CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §54-90 (Supp. 1971). All records retained by the
police and courts relating to an arrestee must be "immediately and automatically erased"
upon his exoneration.
District of Columbia: The Duncan Report, adopted as uncodified law by the Commis-
sioners of the District of Columbia in 1967, places restrictions upon the required mainte-
nance of arrest records by the District police, and provides penalties for unauthorized and
unnecessary dissemination. The report is reprinted in full in Morrow v. District of Colum-
bia, 417 F.2d 728, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also note 32, inIra.
Illinois: ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §206-5 (1969). Records relating to the exonerated
arrestee to be returned to him from the state department of public safety files, but not from
the municipal police files. People v. Lewerenz, 42 Ill. App. 2d 410, 192 N.E.2d 401 (1963).
New York: N.Y. PENAL LAW §516 (McKinney 1967). Once exonerated, the arrestee's
records shall be returned upon demand, unless the arrestee has a prior conviction for a
felony or certain specified misdemeanors.
Ohio: OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §109.60 (Page Supp. 1972). Upon acquittal, the arrestee
can request that the bureau of criminal identification and investigation return his finger-
prints and other identification data.
Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §1405 (c) (1964). The county district attorney
must destroy the fingerprints of all persons acquitted.
2s See, e.g., Sterling v. Oakland, 208 Cal. App.2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962) ; Kolb v. O'Con-
nor, 14 Ill. App.2d 81, 142 N.E.2d 818 (1957); Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J.Eq. 9, 39
A.2d 851 (1944); In re Molineux, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727 (1904). But see Itzkovitch
v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Owen v. Partridge, 40 Misc. 415, 82 N.Y.S.
248 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
2 Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157, 162 (Colo. 1972) (plaintiff, arrested for loitering and sub-
sequently acquitted, requested relief in the nature of a mandamus ordering the records ex-
punged or, in the alternative, returned to her).
2 See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 900 (1972).
28 United States v. Kalish, 271 F.Supp. 968, 970 (D. P.R. 1967).
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Recently, a court has even stated that, when there is no evidence of
a person's misconduct, there is no benefit to society in permitting the
police to retain the arrest records of an exonerated arrestee, except
possibly for statistical purposes.
29
The Duncan Report," later adopted by the Commissioners as un-
codified law for the District of Columbia, recommended that where
there was no conviction the dissemination of arrest records should be
limited to "law enforcement agents," and only when those agents rep-
resent that records will be used solely for "law enforcement pur-
poses."31 In Morrow v. District of Columbia,2 the Court of Appeals
held that a trial court had ancillary jurisdiction to issue orders re-
garding the dissemination of arrest records. Considering the Duncan
Report, the court explained that in the interest of preventing an inva-
sion of privacy, restrictions could be put on the dissemination of arrest
records in cases of exoneration.
A federal court has inherent power to order arrest records ex-
punged where the facts of a case indicate that justice so requires,
according to the court in KowaUi v. United States, 3 which rejected the
previous view that public interest in retaining an exonerated arrestee's
records far outweighed, as a matter of law, any infringement upon
one's right of privacy. 34 But the court did not clearly hold that it was
an invasion of privacy to retain such records. Rather, it concluded
that to do so was an impermissible impingement of one's inalienable
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that such
maintenance of the records might subject the individual to serious
difficulties. Such factors, the court held, justify expunging the records. 35
Right of Privacy
In tort law there is a concept of wrongful invasion of the right
of privacy. The gist of this cause of action is the interference with an
individual's "right to be let alone." This right and cause of action was
first recognized in a law review article by Warren and Brandeis, in
which they defined the right of privacy as the individual's "right of
29J, re Smith, 63 Misc.2d 198, 310 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1970).
30 COMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE EFFECTS OF POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON UNEMPLOY-
MENT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 9 (1967).
31 Id. at 23.
U417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (arrestee's disorderly conduct charge dismissed). But see
Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14, 19 (1971), wherein the court limited the ar-
restee's rights under the Duncan Report to situations in which the arrest was mistaken, not
merely to those in which the arrestee was subsequently exonerated.
33 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (sentence vacated under 28 U.S.C. §2255).
34 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
35Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211, 214 n. 2 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
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determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others."36 Most states today recog-
nize the right and cause of action by case law ;37 a few do so by statute.3
Though the Constitution does not expressly provide for a right
of privacy, courts have protected this right from some acts by the
government, including illegal search and seizure.39 The Supreme Court
in Griswold v. Connecticut 4 held for the first time that there is a con-
stitutional right to privacy, and that a Connecticut statute which made
the use of contraceptives unlawful violated the right to marital privacy.
Relying on the Griswold decision, a Washington (state) appellate
court in Eddy v. Moore41 held that the plaintiff, exonerated after dis-
missal of an assult charge, was entitled to have her fingerprints and
photographs returned, because it was a violation of her constitutional
right of privacy to allow the authorities to retain them, unless the
government could show a compelling necessity for doing so. Although
the state required restrictions on dissemination, it was held that the
statute's failure to provide for return of an exonerated arrestee's
records was a "constitutionally defective omission," 42 in the absence
of a showing of a compelling reason for their retention. The court
also observed that if the presumption of innocence means anything, it
means that an exonerated arrestee should not have a permanent arrest
record. 3
In Carr v. Watkins," police personnel disclosed to plaintiff's pres-
ent employer, certain past non-criminal accusations related to plain-
tiff's fitness to remain employed by a naval ordnance laboratory.
Plaintiff had been vindicated from the charges six years prior to the
disclosure complained of, and his cause of action for invasion of
privacy was therefore sustained. The court held that such disclosure
was a thoughtlessly grave intervention upon the confidentiality of
plaintiff's private affairs. Under this "unauthorized disclosure of pri-
vate affairs" rationale, the arrestee should be able to prevent wrongful
dissemination of his record to persons outside the criminal justice
system.
3 Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARv.L.REv. 193, 198 (1890).
37E.g., Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753 (1970); Apodaca v. Miller, 79 N.M.
160, 441 P.2d 200 (1968).
3 E.g., COLo. REV. STAT. §40-4-33 (Supp. 1967).
39 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
40 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
41 5 Wash. App. 334,487 P.2d 211 (1971).
42id. at 336, 487 P.2d at 214.
43 Id.
"177 A.2d 841 (Md. Ct. App. 1962).
1974]
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Cases that grant relief on an invasion of privacy rationale appear
to use a balancing of interests test; i.e., which has the greater need
of protection- society or the individual? The government's interest
in retaining the records for law enforcement is balanced against the
individual's interest in expungement, to secure his privacy and to
enable him to lead a life free from the collateral effects of a record.
There is no doubt that society must be protected from the criminal
element, but the exonerated arrestee has not been adjudicated a crim-
inal. Further, records retained for the purpose of protecting society
hinder the exonerated arrestee in seeking employment and may thus
drive him to crime, thereby defeating the original purpose of pro-
tecting society.
Balancing these interests, the result in the 1972 Ohio case of State
v. Pinkney45 demonstrates why a court, in the absence of legislative
mandate, must take the initiative to order records expunged. In Pink-
ney, an eighteen-year-old defendant was indicted for first degree mur-
der and later discharged when the jury became deadlocked. While
awaiting retrial, other persons confessed to the crime, defendant was
released, and the charges against him were dropped. Defendant's coun-
sel then filed a motion to expunge the records, and the court granted re-
lief. The court directed the Cleveland Police Department and the county
sheriff to destroy all related records (originals and copies) in their
possession or under their control; the court clerk to seal the records
of the case; and defendant's counsel to request the Ohio State Bureau
of Criminal Identification and Investigation and the federal agencies
(particularly the FBI) to expunge and destroy all records and return
any photographs. The court instructed the police, sheriff, clerk, and
defense counsel to confirm to the court in writing, within ten days,
that the records had been destroyed. The court further ordered all
court index references deleted, the case deemed to never have oc-
curred, and the court and the defendant obliged to reply that "no
record exists" to future inquiries in the matter. The court explained:
It is the opinion of this court that there exists in the indi-
vidual a fundamental right of privacy, the right to be left
alone. The potential economic and personal harm that result
if his arrest becomes known to employers, credit agencies, or
even neighbors, may be catastrophic. 46
Other Grounds for Relief
The arrest that is not founded on probable cause presents an
even stronger argument for the restriction of expungement of an ar-
45 33 Ohio Misc. 183, 290 N.E.2d 923 (Cuy. Cnty. 1972).
4 Id. at 184, 290 N.E.2d at 924.
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restee's record. Judge Bazelon in Menard v. Mitchel47 suggested that
if an arrest is made without probable cause, the Constitution may not
tolerate "any adverse use" of the arrest record and therefore it should
not be retained. 8 The court stated:
Even if the arrest was made lawfully and with the best in-
tentions, if the person arrested has been exonerated it is
difficult to see why he should be subject to continuing punish-
ment by adverse use of his "criminal" records . . .
Where the arrest was illegal from the onset, courts have gen-
erally held that the arrestee is entitled to restriction or expunge-
ment of his arrest records." Such is the case when the police arrest
"hippies" 51 or Negroes 52 for purposes of harrassment, or when an
arrest is made on the basis of a mistaken identity.5 Thus it was held
in Irani v. District of Columbia 4 that a graduate student who was
mistakenly arrested for parading without a permit during a mass
arrest at a civil disturbance, at which he was unavoidably present
but not a participant, was entitled to relief. The court remanded and
left the appropriate form of relief to the trial court's discretion. On
remand, the trial court ordered the records expunged by having the
local police retrieve all disseminated copies and to have them placed
under seal and neither to be opened nor their existence or contents
to be disclosed. 55 In Wheeler v. Goodman,56 a three-judge court held a
vagrancy statute under which arrests were made, unconstitutional.
The court granted an order of expungement of the arrest records
and said the exonerated arrestees would be allowed to deny that the
arrest ever took place when asked orally or on a written document,
such as an employment application.
47 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cit. 1970). Menard was held two days without a charge or a hearing,
and was subsequently released when the police found no basis upon which to charge him
with committing a crime.
4Id. at 481-92.
49 Id. at 495.
50 But see Sterling v. Oakland, 208 Cal. App.2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962) (Expungement of
plaintiff's records denied, even though she had succeeded in a civil action for false arrest by
a citizen).
51 Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F.Supp. 881 (D.C. Pa. 1968) (records ordered expunged after the in-
dividuals were apprehended during an illegal mass arrest and never charged).
9 United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (D.C. Ala. 1967) The records ordered expunged
after arrests were shown to have been made with the intent to interfere with the right to
register and vote, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Id. at 749.
s United States v. Jones, Crim. No. 36388-69 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess., April 1970) as reported
in 38 U. CM. L. REv. 850, 857 n. 37 (1971) (records ordered returned).
- 272 A.2d 849 (1971).
ss Irani v. District of Columbia, 292 A.2d 804 (D.C. App. 1972) (reported the facts and trial
court's decision at 805-07).
5 306 F.Supp. 58 (D.C. N.C. 1969). In Wheeler, young persons were harassed by police on
fifteen separate instances at a "hippie house," eventually arrested for vagrancy, and subse-
quently discharged by nolle prosequi.
1974]
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The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment may
some day be held by the courts to pertain to arrest records. Although
the court in Menard v. Mitchell,57 did not reach this conclusion, it
may have hinted at it when it said that the government can not
classify the innocent with the guilty. 8 This apparently means that
the government can maintain records of the exonerated arrestee, but
must title and file them separately from those of arrestees who have
been convicted. The equal protection clause does not mean that every-
one must be treated alike, but rather that everyone in the same
situation must be treated alike. 59 The exonerated arrestee is in the
same situation as a non-arrestee, if "innocent until proven guilty"
means anything. Therefore, the existence of an arrest record should
not change his situation or classification to something between inno-
cent and guilty.
To a limited extent, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may grant the
exonerated arrestee relief from a record. 60 In Gregory v. Litton Sys-
tems, Inc.61 the plaintiff, being denied employment by the defendant
because of a record of fourteen arrests, but no convictions, requested
an order to constrain the defendant from discriminating against him
because of his arrest records. In granting relief, the court held that
this practice results in racial discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as blacks are more frequently arrested than
whites. The court found that there is no evidence to support the de-
fendant's contention that an employee with several arrests, but no
convictions, is likely to be less honest or reliable than one without
such a record. 62
Another remedy that may give the exonerated arrestee an equal
chance in seeking employment is to limit inquiries. The U.S. Govern-
ment employment application form (Form 75) asks for information
on arrests that lead to a conviction whereas in the past it asked for
information concerning all arrests.6 Such should be the language on
all employment application forms.
574 30 F.2d 486, 492 (D.D.C. 1970).
-8 Id. at 492.
5 9 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
60 But see In re Foster, 72 Misc.2d 1029, 340 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Erie County Ct. 1973). Though
the court ordered the return or destruction of fingerprints and photographs of an arrestee
whose loitering charge was dismissed, it found that Section-"e" of the state's Civil Rights
Law neither authorizes nor requires that other records be expunged.
61316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
62 1d. at 402. Because Title VII also prohibits sexual discrimination, then according to one
commentator, since males are arrested more often than females, denying them employment
because of numerous arrests would also be prohibited. Comment, Arrest Records As A
Racially Discriminating Employment Criterion, 6 HARv.CIv.LIB.L.REv. 165 (1971). The
commentator also found, that to deny white females jobs due to several arrests, may be a
denial of equal protection.
63 REPORT, supra note 8, at 75.
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A Proposal
Existing statutory law is not much help in protecting the ex-
onerated arrestee. However, the aforementioned case law has estab-
lished a precedent allowing the arrestee to bring an action to either
restrict his record from dissemination to the general public6 or to
have it expunged. The necessity for such an action is because of the
unfortunate misinterpretation of the legal meaning and significance
of the arrest record. The meaning that should be ascribed to the
arrest record is discussed by the Supreme Court in Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners:
The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little,
if any, probative value in showing that he engaged in any
misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more than that someone
probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense.65
The legal remedy must satisfy both society and the individual
by a balancing of interests.66 Expungement would be the most effective
remedy, as it would destroy all recorded traces of the event.67 Re-
striction alone is inadequate. Leaks from the criminal justice system
would open the record to the public without notice to the individual
who may learn of the disclosure only after the harm has occurred.
Moreover, relief in the form of an action for unauthorized disclosure
is costly and time consuming.
The balancing of interests test demands expungement, when the
inadequacy of the restrictions remedy is considered along with the
right of privacy, the concept of innocent until proven guilty, the great
social and economic burdens of an arrest record, and the limited
value, if any, of such records to the police and business world. Once
the record has been expunged, the exonerated arrestee will be able
to continue life as if the event had never occurred, with the equal status
and opportunity of all nonarrestees.
Because of first amendment guarantees, statutes should allow
for records to be retained, both within and without the criminal justice
system, until the arrestee is either exonerated or convicted. Excep-
tions could be made if the police felt that this policy would expose
individuals assisting the investigation, or when the court felt it would
deny the arrestee a fair trial.
6See generally Comment, Retention And Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response,
38 U.CHI.L.REv. 850 (1971) for a discussion of the various remedies pertaining to the dis-
closure or dissemination of arrest records.
65 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957) (reversed defendant's exclusion from practice of law because of
three arrests without adjudication).
"See discussion of 'Balancing of Interests' following text at note 44 supra.
67The author suggests the Pinkney case, 33 Ohio Misc. 183, 290 N.E.2d 923 (Cuy. Cnty.
1972) as the basis for an effective statute; see text accompany notes 64 and 65 supra.
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Furthermore, if an arrestee is exonerated, statutes should
provide:
1) That all records held by any person or agency within the
criminal justice system be immediately and automatically
expunged; and that it will be unlawful for any person or
agency outside the criminal justice system to disclose or
disseminate the same.
2) That the event will be deemed to have never occurred, and
the individual may, and all others must, reply accordingly.
3) That it will be a misdemeanor for anyone to disclose, dis-
seminate, or in any other manner make known, the record
of the event.
4) That the individual will be notified of this provision at
the close of the proceedings at trial.
The statutes should also provide that after a record is restricted or
expunged the information may be used for statistical purposes, ar-
ticles, papers, crime prevention, or any and all other deserving goals,
as long as it in no way discloses or makes known the identity of the
individual who is the subject of the record.A
Conclusion
The need for legislation protecting an exonerated arrestee from
the misuse of his arrest record is great. The foregoing is not meant
to be a proposal69 for such legislation, but rather a recommendation
of the necessary elements to be included in order to fully guarantee
the preservation of the arrestee's right to privacy. By protecting the
arrestee's right to privacy we are in reality protecting the arrestee
from all of the adverse effects to which he is now subjected through
the dissemination of his arrest record.
Gregory J. Laket
A New York trial court has held that the exonerated arrestee is entitled to physical expunge-
ment and obliteration of his surname from all arrest records. Henry v. Looney, 65 Misc.2d
759, 317 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1971). This may be a means of protecting the individual's
privacy and at the same time allowing the police and others with an appropriate goal to
retain such records.
69 See Comment, Maintenance And Dissemination of Criminal Records: A Legislative Proposal,
19 U.C.L.A. L.REv. 654, 677-88 (1972) for proposed "model" legislation.
t Second year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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